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Can a compromise be fair? 
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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between compromise and fairness and considers 
in particular why, if a fair outcome to a conflict is available, the conflict should still 
be subject to compromise.  It sets out the defining features of compromise and 
explains how fair compromise differs from both principled and pragmatic 
compromise.  The fairness relating to compromise can be of two types – procedural 
and end-state; it is the coherence of end-state fairness with compromise that proves 
the more puzzling case.  We offer reasons why people should be allowed to resolve 
conflicting or competing claims through compromise, even if compromise comes at 
the expense of end-state fairness, but we resist the suggestion that the primary 
rationale for compromise is to be found in non-ideal circumstances. 
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The question that provides the title of this paper may seem decidedly odd, since it is 
commonplace to describe compromises as fair, or unfair.  Indeed, amongst all the 
values that we might bring to the assessment of compromises, fairness seems pre-
eminent.  Mimicking Rawls, we might say that fairness is the first virtue of 
compromises.  There is good reason why it should be.  The parties to a compromise 
begin from an initial position of conflict and each makes concessions.  Their making 
concessions means that a kind of apportionment or distribution is taking place and, if 
we evaluate that apportionment, the obvious question we should ask is: is it fair?  If, 
for example, we find that one party has made much larger sacrifices than another in 
return for much smaller gains, we may deem the compromise unfair.  
Some writers go even further in relating fairness to compromise.  Theodore 
Benditt (1979: 29), for example, makes fairness intrinsic to the very idea of 
compromise.  Like many writers on compromise, he seeks to distinguish a 
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compromise from a bargain and he finds the critical difference in the attitudes of the 
parties to their conflict: in a bargain, each party seeks simply to get the best deal for 
itself, whereas in a compromise the parties give due consideration to one another’s 
interests and try to find a fair accommodation.   
Several writers argue that fairness or justice can itself demand compromise.  If 
people possess legitimate but conflicting interests or convictions, the right course for 
them is to agree upon a compromise in which each person’s interest or conviction 
receives its due.  To do otherwise is to fail to treat others with the equal concern and 
respect to which they are entitled.  So it is not only possible for a compromise to be 
fair; sometimes fairness itself would seem to demand compromise.
1 
Why, then, should there be anything puzzling in the idea of fair compromise?  
Suppose that A and B register claims that conflict or compete in a way that requires 
resolution.  A and B might, for example, be competing claimants to a good and might 
have different views on how the good should be divided between them.  Suppose too 
that the objectively fair resolution of their competing claims is an equal division of the 
good between them.  Suppose finally that A and B, through deliberation and 
reflection, come to appreciate that dividing the good equally between them would 
indeed be fair and they therefore settle upon that equal division.  Have they arrived at 
a fair compromise?  There is reason deny that they have, since A and B no longer 
disagree.  They began with conflicting views on how the resource should be divided 
between them but have come to adopt the same view, so that the conflict that 
generated the need for compromise has disappeared. 
Agreement on what the fair outcome would be does not, however, remove 
every form of conflict that creates a need, prima facie, for compromise.  Suppose that 
A and B, rather than having different views on how a good ought to be divided 
between them, simply have different and conflicting preferences in relation to a good.  
They might, for example, have different and conflicting preferences about the 
evening’s television programmes they wish to see on their jointly owned television 
set.  Assume that the fair resolution of their conflict is that each should be able to 
view his or her preferred programmes for half of the evening and that A and B 
themselves embrace that arrangement.  Here a fair resolution has not removed 
conflict.  A’s and B’s television preferences remain different and conflicting: the fair 
arrangement has dealt with their conflict without erasing it.   
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Here we run into a different objection to the idea of fair compromise.  If a fair 
outcome to a conflict is available, should we conceive it as properly a matter of 
compromise at all?  In reaching a compromise, the compromising parties have 
discretion over the agreement they reach; but can it be morally acceptable that they 
should be at liberty to agree on any but a fair outcome, supposing that one is 
available?  People should be fair to others and they should not treat that ‘should’ as a 
matter of choice.  That is not to say, of course, that the availability of a fair resolution 
will remove the need for compromise in reality.  People do not always do what they 
ought to do and they may need to be induced to compromise on matters that ought not 
to require their compromise.  But, from a moral point of view, the availability of a fair 
resolution would seem to make compromise redundant.  So even when a fair 
arrangement does not erase conflict, it may still seem to pre-empt compromise. 
Consider too the attitudes appropriate to fairness and compromise.  In a 
compromise, each party makes concessions that he would prefer not to make.  Each 
would prefer that his initial claims could be met in full, but each makes concessions to 
the other as the price he has to pay to secure a resolution of the conflict.  The parties 
to a compromise must have something to gain from it, if only peaceful coexistence, 
since otherwise they would not be induced to compromise.  It is the prospect of that 
gain that induces them to compromise; but, in compromising, each still pays a price 
for the gain that he would prefer not pay.  In that respect, compromising entails regret.  
But suppose now that a fair resolution to the conflict is available.  If that outcome 
really is fair, it seems quite inappropriate that each party should view it with regret.  It 
seems equally inappropriate that each party should regard the fair outcome as a matter 
of concession.  If a fair outcome is available, we should rush to embrace it rather than 
accept it with grudging reluctance. 
Consider, for example, how Rawls’s citizens stand in relation to justice as 
fairness (Rawls, 1993, 2001).  The citizens of his liberal society have different and 
conflicting conceptions of the good stemming from their different and conflicting, but 
reasonable, comprehensive doctrines.  Rawls presents us with a political conception 
of justice that is appropriate for the basic structure of a society marked by that 
pluralism.  A major feature of that political conception is that, as far as possible, 
citizens should not use political power to favour their own conception of the good or 
to disadvantage the reasonable conceptions of others.  Such partisan use of political 
power would be unfair. 
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How would Rawls’s citizens view the requirements of justice?  They might 
conceive them as the product of a grand compromise.  Each would like to use political 
power to advance his own conception of the good to the maximum possible extent and 
to suppress conceptions of which he disapproves.  The trouble is that every other 
citizen would like to do the same.  So the best deal they can secure amongst 
themselves is one that allows none of them to use political power for that purpose.  
That is certainly the way in which the parties in the original position would think, 
since they seek to gain the maximum advantage for those they represent, even though 
they are constrained in their endeavours by the veil of ignorance.  But the fictional 
parties in the original position are not Rawlsian citizens.  The original position is 
merely a ‘device of representation’ for working out what justice requires.  Good 
Rawlsian citizens will not conceive the principles of justice as the outcome of a 
bargain, nor will they comply with them in a spirit of compromise.  They will want to 
be just, simply because just is what they ought to be.  Even if they could depart from 
the constraints of justice with impunity, they would not do so, since they are 
committed to the principles of justice as principles of right conduct.  Thus, Rawlsian 
citizens will not see the justice of their just society as a manifestation of compromise.
2
  
The question of how fairness relates to compromise is also part of a much 
larger question concerning the relation between compromise and morality in general.  
Why are compromises necessary?  A possible answer is: because morality is often not 
up to the job.  There are some conflicts for which morality does not provide and for 
which, in the absence of a ‘right answer’, compromise is our best option.   
Alternatively, the problem may be that morality, rather than providing us with 
no answer, yields too many. People may believe there is a right answer, but may have 
quite different views of what the right answer is; in that case the ‘right answer’ will 
simply compound the problem rather than solve it.  Compromise may therefore be a 
response to moral disagreement, reasonable or unreasonable, rather than a way of 
filling a moral ‘hole’.  Either way, the project of subjecting compromises to moral 
scrutiny will seem misplaced.  In one case, there is no moral norm we can use for 
scrutiny, and, in the other, it is the very absence of an agreed norm that makes 
compromise necessary.  The more sceptical we are about the capacity of morality to 
yield agreed answers or any answers at all, the more we shall find a role for 
compromise.  Perhaps, then, compromises belong to a morality-free zone, so that 
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there is a problem about subjecting them not only to a test of fairness, but to any sort 
of moral test.  
 In examining these issues, we begin by analysing what a compromise is. We 
go on to consider Simon May’s distinction between pragmatic and principled 
compromise and indicate that fair compromise is not wholly congruent with either 
type of compromise.  We divide the fairness relevant to compromise into two sorts: 
procedural fairness and end-state fairness. There is nothing problematic about the 
conjunction of compromises and pure procedural fairness, but there is something 
prima facie puzzling about the conjunction of compromises and end-state fairness.  
We attempt to remove that puzzle by showing how a compromise can be 
substantively fair and yet still retain the defining features of compromise.  We also 
explain why a legitimate compromise need not be fair, and we identify reasons why 
the parties to a potential compromise should have the freedom to compromise, even 
when the competition between the parties’ claims is governed by a principle of 
fairness that indicates the right outcome independently of their compromise.  Finally, 
we consider how the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory bears on the 
relationship between compromise and fairness and argue that, while compromises can 
have a role in non-ideal circumstances, there is no reason to exclude compromises 
from the domain of ideal theory. 
 
1. What is a compromise? 
 
In tackling the relationship between compromise and fairness, an obvious first step is 
to examine what a compromise is.  What, then, are the essential features of a 
compromise? 
 
(a) Two or more parties 
A compromise has to be made between two or more parties.  The parties can be 
individual persons, groups, associations, or institutions.  That simple condition is not 
entirely uncontroversial since we sometimes speak of compromise as if it were 
intrapersonal.  For example, if X sacrifices his principles to his ambition, he might be 
said to have ‘compromised’ his principles, in which case he will have compromised 
himself.  ‘Compromise’ might also be used to describe trade-offs of values of the sort 
that value-pluralists believe inescapable, even though the relevant conflict is amongst 
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values rather than valuers (cf. Benjamin, 1990).  We treat these intrapersonal or 
impersonal notions of compromise as figurative and parasitic upon the standard 
notion of compromise as an inter-personal or inter-party matter. 
 
(b) Conflict 
There has to be conflict of some sort between the parties. If there is no conflict, there 
can be no occasion for compromise.  The conflict can be grounded in different 
preferences, interests, principles, beliefs or judgements.  Those differences in types of 
conflict do not affect whether something is a compromise, though they may be 
relevant to our thinking on the appropriateness of compromise.     
 
 (c) Engaged in by the parties themselves or by their representatives 
A compromise is something reached by those who are party to it, or by others who are 
empowered to act as their representatives.  A compromise is not a solution imposed 
by a third party.  When a third party divides the spoils between two conflicting parties 
and imposes that division upon them, people sometimes describe that as an ‘imposed 
compromise’.  But that usage departs from the ordinary idea of compromise.3  A third 
party might ‘mediate’ in a compromise, but their mediation does not replace the need 
for the compromise to be agreed upon by those who are party to it. 
 The case of arbitration is slightly more complicated.  Arbitration is often 
included within the scope of compromise and sometimes the reason given is that 
arbitrators are inclined to split the difference between those amongst whom they 
arbitrate (e.g. Golding, 1979: 20-1).  But that is not reason to treat arbitration as 
compromise; an arbitrator’s decision is unilateral rather than a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement.  However, if the conflicting parties agree to arbitration, their agreement 
can amount to a compromise, just as agreeing to resolve a dispute by the toss of a coin 
can be a compromise.  The agreement of the parties remains crucial here: if arbitration 
is forced upon the parties, it does not constitute compromise – at least, not for the 
conflicting parties.  And if the arbitrator decides to give all that is at stake to one party 
and none to other, the parties’ prior agreement to accept his arbitration does not cease 
to be a compromise.  Incidentally, the possibility that parties can compromise by 
agreeing to arbitration, or to decision by a random process, means that compromise 
solutions are possible even when the good at stake is indivisible (Benjamin, 1990: 6-
7). 
 7 
  
(d) All parties make concessions 
A compromise has to be a two-sided or multi-sided deal.  It is a compromise only if 
both, or all, parties give ground.  Capitulation can be unilateral but compromise 
cannot.  The concessions made by the parties do not have to be equal and that raises 
the awkward question of just how asymmetrical a compromise can be and remain a 
compromise.  If a deal is within a smidgen of complete capitulation by one party, 
should we still deem it a compromise?  But, setting aside that marginal case, it is 
essential to the idea of a compromise that all parties to it make concessions. 
 
(e) Process 
Compromising normally involves some sort of process.  This may take the form of 
protracted discussion or negotiation, or it may be little short of instantaneous (‘You 
want x; I want y. Why don’t we split the difference?’ ‘OK, it’s a deal.’).  But some 
sort of process is implied in a compromise’s being reached by the compromisers 
themselves. 
 
 (f) A compromise is agreed to 
A compromise is something that the parties ‘make’ or ‘agree to’ or ‘enter into’.  To be 
a party to a compromise is to have entered into, and to have assumed, a commitment.  
In that respect, compromises are like promises.  Indeed, J. Patrick Dobel (1990: 3, 35) 
describes them as ‘co-promises’.  Thus, the reason for adhering to a compromise, like 
the reason for keeping a promise, is not reducible to the reasons for making it.  That is 
important since people are sometimes inclined to think of a compromise as a mere 
balance of advantage, which each party has reason to adhere to only so long as they 
continue to find it advantageous.  But agreeing to a compromise, like making a 
promise, involves entering into an undertaking and the obligation to adhere to that 
undertaking provides an ‘exclusionary reason’ for adhering to it.  That exclusionary 
reason is not reducible to, nor should it be subordinated to, the sort of on-balance 
calculation of advantage that might reasonably determine whether someone should 
enter into a compromise in the first instance.
4
  
 
These, then, we take to be the defining features of compromise.  Some analysts agree 
with Benditt in distinguishing compromises from bargains (e.g. Coons, 1979: 191-2; 
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Lister, 2007: 17-18), but that distinction is not easy to maintain if we keep faith with 
ordinary usage.  For instance, if an employer and a trade union engage in bargaining 
over wages and conditions, it would be quite normal to describe the result of their 
negotiations as a compromise even though it is entirely a product of bargaining.  The 
very idea of ‘negotiating’ a compromise implies an element of bargaining.  In 
ordinary usage the terms ‘bargain’ and ‘compromise’ are overlapping rather than 
either co-extensive or mutually exclusive.  Entering a shop and buying a bar of 
chocolate for a fixed price involves a bargain between purchaser and seller, but we 
would not normally describe it as a compromise.  Conversely, if the parties to a 
conflict seek a fair accommodation of their different wishes and deliberate, rather than 
negotiate, their way to an outcome, we would be more inclined to describe the 
outcome as a compromise than a bargain.  Here we simply bracket the question of 
how compromises relate to bargains. 
 
2. Pragmatic and principled compromise 
 
When we move from what a compromise is to the different forms it might take, it is 
useful to follow Simon May’s lead in distinguishing between principled and 
pragmatic compromises (May, 2005).  A pragmatic compromise is wholly goal-based 
in nature.  In a pragmatic compromise, people compromise to achieve a goal and in 
compromising they concede as much as they need, but only as much as they need, to 
secure the goal.  A pragmatic compromise is therefore wholly instrumental and 
strategic in nature.  Compromising involves making sacrifices and the parties will aim 
to keep their sacrifices to the minimum necessary to secure the compromise that will 
promote their goal.
5
  
A principled compromise, by contrast, is driven by principle.  We compromise 
in a principled way when we act on the belief that we owe it to others to concede 
something to their position.  Suppose, for example, that we are parties to a 
disagreement with others but our disagreement is ‘reasonable’; each has reason to 
recognise the reasonableness of the claims of others even though he disagrees with 
them.  In that case, it may be incumbent upon us, as a matter of principle, to enter into 
a compromise with our disputants.  Our compromise will be neither instrumental nor 
goal-based in motivation; rather it will reflect our acceptance that, in the given 
circumstances, compromising with others is the intrinsically right thing to do.  Several 
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theorists, for example, have suggested that conflicts over abortion can be, and ought 
to be, resolved by compromises that take this principled form.
6
 
The distinction between principled and pragmatic compromise is not a 
distinction between morally motivated and non-morally motivated compromise.  
Consider two warring states who are contemplating compromising with one another 
in order to put an end to their conflict.  The representatives of those states may be 
under a weighty moral imperative to pursue peace, given the bloodshed and human 
suffering that continued war will entail.  Even so, the compromise through which they 
pursue the goal can remain wholly pragmatic.  The goal may be morally urgent, and 
the state representatives may conceive it as morally urgent, but, in so far as nothing 
but the goal motivates their compromise, each still has reason to behave in a wholly 
strategic way: each has reason to concede only as much as he needs to achieve the 
compromise.  Hence, the fact that a compromise is a self-conscious instrument of a 
morally worthy and important goal does not, on its own, transform it from a pragmatic 
to a principled compromise. 
Our concern is with fair compromise and that sort of compromise may seem to 
be subsumed by the more general idea of principled compromise.  In fact, fair 
compromise, as we shall use that idea, is not wholly congruent with either sort of 
compromise.  It clearly differs from pragmatic compromise in that the fairness of a 
compromise is not a function of the goal pursued through the compromise or of the 
strategic minimum each party has to concede to secure the compromise.  But neither 
is it wholly subsumed by the idea of principled compromise.  As May uses that term, 
it describes the reason for compromising – there is a principled reason, rather than a 
goal-based reason, for entering into a compromise with others.  By contrast, logically, 
principle need play no part in generating a fair compromise.  For example, two parties 
who have roughly equal bargaining strengths and equal interests in a conflict are 
likely to arrive at a compromise that divides the spoils equally between them.  That 
equal division may be precisely what fairness demands, so that their compromise is 
fair.  But, as this example illustrates, neither party to a fair compromise need have 
been motivated by considerations of fairness in reaching the compromise; each may 
have aimed only to maximise his own advantage.  
However, while that is a logical possibility, it is one that is likely to occur only 
under very special conditions, such as those that characterise the example we have 
given.  If the parties approach a compromise as an exercise in pure bargaining, the 
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outcome will reflect their relative bargaining strengths and, if there is anything fair 
about the outcome, that will be a matter of pure chance.  Generally, only those who 
seek a fair compromise will actually light upon one.  In reality therefore, a fair 
compromise is more likely to emerge if the parties allow themselves to be guided by a 
principle of fairness in the compromising process.  That brings the idea of fair 
compromise closer to May’s idea of principled compromise since, if a principle such 
as fairness provides the reason for entering a compromise, it will also normally 
provide reason for aiming for a particular sort of compromise – one that is fair.  
However, the two ideas are still not wholly aligned.  May’s principled compromise 
excludes goal-based compromise but fair compromise does not – provided that ‘goal-
based’ describes the parties’ reason for seeking a compromise rather than the manner 
in which they compromise.  The parties may set about compromising for entirely 
goal-based reasons, but still be concerned that their goal-directed compromise should 
be fair to all who are party to it. 
 Before moving on from the idea of principled compromise, we might note that 
principles can provide the subject-matter of compromise.  That is, the conflict that 
creates a potential for compromise may be one that arises from the parties’ possessing 
different and conflicting principles.  When a conflict of principles arises, it is possible 
that there might be another principle, or ‘meta-principle’, that should govern its 
resolution (although, as we indicate below, that cannot be taken for granted), in which 
case there will be scope for principled compromise of principled conflict.  But it is 
also possible that a compromise of principles will be motivated and justified by a 
goal.  When people find reason to compromise on matters of principle, their reason is 
very commonly that the compromise promotes a goal whose importance justifies the 
sacrifice of principle.
7
  
However, a principled compromise does not have to be a compromise of 
principles.  If two parties have conflicting interests or preferences, there can also be a 
principled way of resolving that conflict.  Indeed, if we take the idea of fair 
compromise, that idea applies much more readily to conflicts of interest or preference 
than to conflicts of principle, since promoting interests and satisfying preferences 
benefit those whose interests and preferences they are, whereas complying with a 
principle does not, in a similarly straightforward way, benefit the holders of the 
principle or disadvantage those who reject it.
8
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3. Compromise and two types of fairness 
 
The idea of fair compromise brings with it the issues that we outlined at the start of 
this paper.  If compromising can be a way of securing a fair arrangement, why should 
that arrangement be contingent upon compromise at all; and, if people merely comply 
with what fairness requires, should they – and should we – conceive their compliance 
as an act of compromise? 
  
In tackling those questions, we need first to consider in virtue of what a compromise 
might be fair or unfair.  Compromising yields an outcome – the compromise that the 
parties settle upon – and we can examine whether that outcome is fair.  We can look, 
for example, at how the sacrifices and gains are distributed amongst the 
compromising parties and consider whether that distribution is fair.  We might 
describe the relevant fairness here as ‘end-state fairness’.  But compromising also 
involves a process – a process of bargaining, negotiation or deliberation – and we 
might scrutinise the fairness of that process, independently of its outcome.  We are 
then concerned with ‘procedural fairness’, a fairness that concerns how the 
compromise was arrived at rather than what the compromise is. 
 
4. Compromise and procedural fairness 
 
Can a compromise be fair in virtue of the procedure by which it is reached, rather than 
in virtue of its content considered independently of that procedure?  If it can, we can 
make sense of why the fairness secured by a compromise must be secured by way of 
compromise.  Without the parties undertaking the process of compromising, we shall 
have no way of knowing whether the relevant outcome is or is not fair, since the 
fairness of an outcome will depend entirely upon the fairness of the process by which 
it has been generated.  We cannot short-circuit things, avoid the process of 
compromising, and go straight to a fair outcome, since a compromise will be fair only 
in virtue of its being the outcome of a fair process. 
 Rawls (1999a: 74-77) describes fairness of this wholly procedural sort as ‘pure 
procedural justice’, though we shall use the term ‘pure procedural fairness’.  A lottery 
provides a clear example of this sort of fairness.  Assume that a lottery is conducted 
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fairly and Smith wins the prize.  There is no way in which we could identify Smith’s 
receiving the prize as the fair outcome independently, or in advance, of the lottery’s 
being conducted.  Smith’s receiving the prize is fair only because it is the outcome of 
a procedure that has been conducted fairly. 
 Analogously, we might imagine ourselves specifying conditions that govern 
the relative starting points of the parties to the negotiations, the kinds of pressures 
they can and cannot legitimately bring to bear upon the process, the types of 
information they should be required to divulge and the types they can legitimately 
keep to themselves, and so on.  We might conceive these as the conditions of pure 
procedural fairness, such that any compromise that emerges from the procedure can 
be deemed fair merely in virtue of its emerging from the procedure.  If that is what we 
understand a fair compromise to be, there will be nothing puzzling about its being 
both ‘fair’ and a ‘compromise’. 
 But we might also conceive the fairness of a procedure in a quite different 
way.  We might describe a procedure as fair in virtue of its propensity to yield 
outcomes whose fairness we can identify independently of the procedure.  We know 
what are fair outcomes and we judge a procedure to be fair or unfair in virtue of its 
record, or its probability, of producing those outcomes.  Rawls describes this sort of 
procedural fairness as ‘perfect’ or ‘imperfect’ procedural justice (1999a: 74-75).  It is 
‘perfect’ if the procedure is guaranteed to yield just outcomes and ‘imperfect’ if it is 
not.  If, for example, justice demands that each of a number of people receives an 
equal share of a cake, requiring the person who cuts the cake to take the last slice is a 
good candidate for perfect procedural justice.  The procedure used in a criminal trial 
exemplifies imperfect procedural justice.  We know independently of the judicial 
procedure what justice demands – the conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of the 
innocent – and we design the procedure so that it will be likely to secure those 
outcomes.  But we also know that, however well we design the procedure, it will not 
always deliver the right outcome; it therefore exemplifies imperfect procedural 
justice.  We shall describe the sort of fairness that Rawls calls perfect or imperfect 
justice as ‘end-state procedural fairness’, since it identifies a procedure as fair in 
virtue of its propensity to produce an end-state that is fair and an end-state whose 
fairness is identifiable independently of the procedure. 
 We observed a moment ago that, if by a ‘fair compromise’ we mean only one 
that is yielded by pure procedural fairness, there is nothing puzzling about its being 
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both ‘fair’ and a ‘compromise’.  However, the position is not similarly straightforward 
if the procedural fairness we invoke is end-state procedural fairness.  That sort of 
procedural fairness implies that we can know what a fair end-state would be, and 
therefore what a substantively fair compromise would be, independently of the 
procedure that yields it.  It also implies that we can assess the procedure as fair or 
unfair only if and because we know what the fair outcome would be.   This sort of 
procedural fairness therefore returns us to the issue of why, if an outcome can be 
substantively fair, it should also be the object of a compromise.  Moreover, that issue 
is not fundamentally one of procedural fairness at all; it turns on the idea of end-state 
fairness.  So, to examine it, we need to investigate how an outcome can be appraised 
as substantively, rather than merely procedurally, fair and yet still be properly subject 
to compromise.  Before turning to that question, two other points concerning 
procedural fairness are worth noting. 
 First, end-state procedural fairness can morph into pure procedural fairness.  
In constructing a procedure, we may be guided by an end-state conception of fairness 
but, once the procedure is up and running, we may begin to conceive its outcomes as 
fair simply because they are outcomes of that procedure.  In other words, while we 
begin by conceiving the procedure in terms of end-state fairness, we eventually shift 
to conceiving it in terms of pure procedural fairness.  The way we often speak of a 
‘fair trial’ exemplifies that shift.  In constructing procedures for a criminal trial, we 
should be guided by what processes will most effectively detect guilt and innocence.  
But, once the procedure is in operation, we typically mean by a ‘fair trial’ one that has 
complied with all the requirements of due process and not necessarily one that has 
delivered a correct verdict.  Someone can receive a ‘fair trial’ and yet still be wrongly 
convicted.  A possible reason for this shift is that, although we know that the accused 
must be, as a matter of fact, guilty or innocent, we normally have no way of 
determining that matter of fact separately from the trial process itself.  In a fashion 
similar to our thinking on a fair trial, our conception of a fair procedure for making 
compromises may be geared initially to our thinking about what sorts of outcome 
(end-state) would be fair.  But once we have worked out what the rules should be and 
have a general procedure in place, we may come to think of particular compromises 
as fair merely in virtue of their being outcomes of that procedure. 
 Secondly, a purely procedural approach to fair compromise seems to imply 
bargaining and negotiation rather than deliberation.  People can bargain and negotiate 
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under fair conditions, so that their eventual compromise can intelligibly count as fair 
because it has been arrived at under those fair conditions.  But if the parties pursue 
their compromise through deliberation rather than bargaining or negotiation, and if 
their deliberations are about what would constitute a fair resolution of their 
differences, they will be deliberating about what would be the fair end-state.  So, if 
the parties deliberate rather than bargain their way to a fair compromise, they cannot 
suppose that pure procedural fairness is the only sort of fairness at stake in their 
compromise. 
 
5. Compromise and end-state fairness 
 
In examining the relationship between compromise and end-state fairness, we begin 
by examining how it is that a legitimate compromise can be fair and yet still a 
compromise, and also how it can be unfair and yet still a legitimate compromise.  In 
the next section, we consider what it is that might justify this state of affairs. 
 To say that an issue is properly subject to compromise is to say that, as a 
matter of fact, it is one on which two or more parties present conflicting claims.  It is 
also to say that, as a matter of right, it is up to the parties themselves, or their 
representatives, to settle their conflict.  That is consistent with the parties’ using the 
services of a mediator, but the outcome will be a compromise only if it proves 
acceptable to both or all of the parties and only if they agree to it.  Once they agree to 
a compromise, they have an obligation to comply with it for that reason.  The 
legitimacy or validity of a compromise is therefore distinct from its end-state fairness.  
A compromise is legitimate or valid if and because the parties have consented to it, so 
that the obligation to adhere to the compromise derives, at least in the first instance, 
from the way it has come about rather than from its content. 
 The distinction between procedural and end-state fairness remains significant 
for the relationship between the legitimacy and the fairness of a compromise.  The 
fairness of the process through which a compromise is reached may well affect its 
validity, particularly if it has been unfair in a way that calls into question the 
authenticity of the consent given by one or more of the parties.  If, for example, one 
party has used trickery or deception to fool the other into entering into a compromise 
that is not the compromise he believed himself to be entering, we may hold that the 
wronged party is freed from the normal obligation of compliance.  The sort of fraught 
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circumstances in which the need for compromise can arise may give us reason not to 
be overly demanding in specifying the procedural fairness that is necessary for a 
compromise to be valid.  But, in general terms, it is easy to see how procedural 
unfairness, especially unfairness that affects the authenticity of the parties’ consent, 
might undermine a compromise’s legitimacy. 
The same is not true of end-state fairness.  As we have emphasised, a 
compromise is something that the parties enter into and agree to.  In so doing, they 
assume an obligation to one another of the sort they would incur were they to promise 
or to give some other form of undertaking.  The obligation they incur constitutes an 
exclusionary reason to abide by the compromise, so that the parties’ reason to comply 
with it is not wholly contingent upon their subsequent view of its substantive fairness, 
even if they judge it, and judge it correctly, to be substantively unfair.  The legitimacy 
of a compromise depends upon the parties’ consenting to it; its end-state fairness, or 
unfairness, concerns its content and provides a test separate from that of consent.   
Thus, if we hold that a conflict is properly subject to compromise, so that the 
agreement of the parties to the conflict is a necessary condition of its being properly 
resolved, a fair end-state resolution will not suffice.  A third party might, for example, 
impose a substantively fair resolution upon the conflicting parties but, in the absence 
of the parties’ own consent, the fairness of the resolution will not suffice; the consent 
of the parties themselves remains necessary if the resolution is to obligate them.  For 
the same reason, if the parties strike a deal that is recognisably fair, the fairness of the 
deal does not make it something other than a compromise; it is still a compromise in 
that it is the parties’ agreement that makes it a binding deal for them.  The 
separateness of consent and end-state fairness also makes it possible for end-state 
fairness not to be a necessary condition of compromise’s legitimacy; a compromise 
can be substantively unfair and yet still be valid and obligatory as a compromise. 
Can the fact that A and B are in disagreement alter what is substantively fair 
and make their compromise determinative of what is substantively fair?  Suppose, for 
example, that A and B are in conflict over how a good should be divided between 
them.  Each believes he should receive 75% and the other 25%.  Looked at 
objectively, the fair outcome is that A should receive 75% and B 25%.  That objective 
assessment might be based, for example, on our assessment of what each has 
contributed to producing the good and our discovery that A has contributed three 
times as much as B.  Can the fact that B believes he should receive 75% and enters the 
 16 
compromising process demanding 75% alter the standing of A’s and B’s claims, so 
that dividing the good equally between them becomes the substantively fair outcome?  
Or perhaps, rather than altering the fair outcome, the way in which A and B disagree 
creates a different sort of fair outcome that is somehow additional to, rather than a 
substitute for, the objectively fair outcome.  It is very hard to see why we should 
accept either of these possibilities.  Allowing that B’s false belief about his fair share 
might alter what his fair share actually is would be rather like allowing that his false 
belief might alter what is actually true.  Notice however that, even if we were to allow 
either of these possibilities, the substantive fairness of the outcome would remain 
logically independent of the outcome agreed upon by the parties.  We alter our 
thinking on what is the fair outcome in light of the fact that A and B each believes he 
should receive 75% and we go on to conclude that, in these circumstances, 50% each 
becomes a fair outcome.  We then have a new standard for judging the fairness of the 
distribution between A and B, but that standard is still grounded independently of 
whatever A and B themselves actually agree upon.  In other words, the end-state 
fairness of a compromise remains contingently related to its being a compromise, and 
its being a compromise does not pre-empt the issue of its end-state fairness.   
Is end-state fairness, then, of no relevance to the obligation to adhere to a 
compromise? We need not hold that it can never be relevant.  We might think that a 
point could come at which a compromise was so substantively unfair, that it lost 
obligatory force.  In conformity with this thought, British contract law requires the 
terms of a contract to fall within certain outer limits of fairness relating to the 
substance of the contract as well as to the circumstances in which it was agreed 
(Office of Fair Trading 2008).  Insofar as a contract fails to meet those standards, a 
court will not recognise and uphold it.  In a similar fashion, the exclusionary reason to 
adhere to a compromise created by the parties’ agreement need not exclude every sort 
of reason to the contrary.  But, even if we allow that extraordinarily that may be so, 
ordinarily the parties will be bound by their compromise in virtue of having entered 
into it rather than because of its content. 
Can a compromise’s end-state fairness add to our reason for complying with 
it?  If we always have reason, at least pro tanto, to be fair, the answer must be yes.  
But, given that the obligation to comply with a compromise derives, in the first 
instance, from the parties’ agreement to it, any additional reason supplied by 
substantive fairness will normally mean only that the obligation to comply is morally 
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overdetermined.  The one case in which the substantive fairness of a compromise 
could make a critical difference is when a reason arises that argues for defection from 
the compromise.  Then, in calculating whether, all things considered, we should 
defect, the compromise’s substantive fairness (or unfairness) might make a critical 
difference. 
So far we have considered what difference, if any, end-state fairness might 
make once a compromise is in place.  But how should end-state fairness bear on the 
compromising process?  Should it not motivate the compromising parties?  We should 
note to begin with that the obligatoriness of a compromise, like the obligatoriness of a 
promise, is unaffected by the motivation of the parties to it; their obligation to comply 
derives from their having agreed to the compromise rather than from their having 
agreed to it for a particular sort of reason.  A major exception to that general truth 
would arise if their reason somehow affected the authenticity of the parties’ consent; 
if, for example, they were acting under the kind of duress that would invalidate their 
consent 
That gives rise to a second consideration: would anyone genuinely consent to 
a compromise that was substantively unfair?  It is easy to see why they would if the 
unfairness went in their favour, but suppose it went against them.  Even in that case, 
the pay-off the party expects to gain from the compromise may make the unfairness a 
price worth paying and therefore a price worthy of their consent. Indeed, it would not 
be surprising if both parties to a compromise believed that their claim had received 
less than its due in the compromise; both, even so, might genuinely consent to the 
compromise because, for both, the anticipated benefit makes the perceived unfairness 
tolerable. 
However, those two points do not entirely dispose of the puzzle with which we 
began this article.  If we always have moral reason to be fair, that would seem to 
imply that the parties in reaching a compromise should aim for end-state fairness – 
assuming that there is an end-state fairness for which they can aim.  But if they have 
that obligation to be fair, the idea of ‘fair compromise’ may once again seem 
paradoxical: how can the parties have an obligation to treat one another fairly, and yet 
still have the moral freedom to enter into a compromise that is less than fair to the 
other party?  That apparent paradox is a common enough phenomenon when we 
extend domains of freedom to people.  A right can include a right to do wrong (Jones, 
1994: 204-5).  If we give people the right to a significant area of freedom, we may 
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disapprove of the use they make of it yet still accept that they have a right to use it in 
that way.  For instance, others may criticise me for living the life of a couch potato 
rather than developing my talents, and yet still accept that my life is mine and that I 
have the right to live it as I choose.  That is why someone’s having a right does not 
render them immune from criticism for the use they make of it.  Similarly, the parties 
to a compromise may be entitled to settle on whatever terms they find acceptable, but 
they may still have moral reason to exercise that entitlement in one way rather than 
another. We can consistently therefore accept that a particular compromise is 
legitimate and a source of obligation for those who are party to it, but still judge it to 
be unfair and criticise it for its unfairness. 
 Earlier, we noted that it is logically possible for a compromise to be 
substantively fair even though the compromising parties had arrived at it through pure 
bargaining and with no eye to fairness.  We also noted that, in reality, a substantively 
fair compromise is much more likely to emerge if the parties aim for one.  For that 
reason, a substantively fair compromise is more likely to arise if the compromising 
process takes the form of deliberation rather than bargaining. Suppose that the parties 
do engage in deliberation with the intention of arriving at a fair outcome and, through 
deliberation, come to settle upon a fair outcome.  Have they not then substituted 
consensus for compromise?  The answer depends upon the sort of right outcome they 
have agreed upon.   
If A and B begin with conflicting claims, deliberate about their claims, and 
eventually reach a consensus that dissolves their conflict, the occasion for 
compromise will have disappeared.  In the course of the deliberation, A and B have 
found reason to revise their claims until they reached a point at which their claims 
ceased to be conflicting.  In that case, what has gone on during the deliberative 
process should be described as ‘correction’ rather than compromise; each has 
corrected his original position to a point at which the two positions cease to be 
different (May, 2005: 318-319).  They might, for example, have been in dispute about 
the right policy, but their deliberation might have been a process of moral learning in 
which they eventually came to see the same policy as right. 
But suppose now that A and B start out with conflicting claims, deliberate 
about the fair resolution of their conflict, and come to agree upon what a fair 
resolution to their conflicting claims would be.  That is a different matter.  In that 
case, they have retained their conflicting claims; all they have agreed upon is the fair 
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resolution of their conflict; their agreement leaves the conditions for compromise 
intact.  As before, a process of moral learning may have taken place, but this time 
what A and B have learned has not dispelled their conflicting claims but only how 
they might be dealt with fairly.   So it is possible for A and B to deliberate their way to 
a fair outcome and yet still engage in compromise once they have identified what the 
fair outcome is. 
 
6. Why compromise? 
 
What justifies the practice of compromise?  The answer could be that, on many 
occasions, fairness fails to indicate a right outcome or is itself in dispute, so that 
compromise is the only practical option.  We consider that possibility in the next 
section.  Here we want to suppose, as in the previous section, that there is a principle 
of end-state fairness that should govern the parties’ conflict, and to argue that there 
can still be reason to allow the parties themselves to resolve their conflict through 
compromise. We do not claim that the reasons we give constitute an exhaustive list. 
First, compromises are but one form of agreement that people can enter into 
and their ability to make agreements with others, whether through compromises, 
promises, contracts, or other sorts of undertaking, is an important element of human 
freedom.  A world in which people were bereft of any opportunity to enter into self-
chosen compromise arrangements with others would be one in which their freedom 
was seriously impoverished.  So, even if an impartial spectator could identify, and 
could correctly identify, a fair outcome to the competing claims of the parties, we 
would still have reason to allow those parties to settle the issue for themselves.  To 
express the same point in other terms, we may deem some matters to be properly a 
person’s own business, so that the settlement of those matters is not the business of 
others, no matter how well informed and correct the moral judgement of those others 
may be.  
Secondly, there are some institutions or rights that we value that bring with 
them the possibility of compromise.  If people are to enjoy a significant range of 
personal freedoms and if those are to include the freedom to enter into arrangements 
with others, it is hard to see how that freedom could exclude the freedom to enter into 
compromises.  Similarly, if people are to enjoy meaningful property rights of any sort, 
it is hard to see how those rights could not include the freedom to enter into deals with 
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others.  While this second defence of compromise is close to the first, it has a different 
logic: the appeal is not directly to the value of compromise as a freedom but to the 
value of rights and institutions of which opportunities for compromise will be 
inescapably a part. 
Thirdly, we might defend compromises on grounds of efficiency or well-
being.  A resolution agreed to by the parties to a conflict may serve them better than a 
resolution imposed by a third party.  Of course, we cannot know that that will always 
be so, but the issue here is close to that of whether people’s well-being is better served 
by subjecting them to the paternalistic rule of others or by leaving them free to 
determine the course of their own lives.  We may believe that we know better than the 
compromising parties what the best outcome would be and, on occasion, we may be 
correct in that belief, but we may also have reason to accept that, as a matter of 
general practice, efficiency and well-being are better served by leaving the parties to 
make their own arrangements rather than subjecting them to a third-party view.  One 
reason why that might be so is that, for the compromising parties, more than fairness 
may be at stake; as we indicated previously, the ‘losing’ party in an unfair 
compromise may think the unfairness a price worth paying for the good he secures 
through the compromise.
9
 
 Fourthly, it will often be the case that more than one fair outcome is available. 
Consider two people who want to go on a fortnight’s holiday together but who have 
different preferences about where they should go; one prefers France, the other Italy.  
Assume that the two people are of equal status and their preferences are equally 
intense.  In that case, several possible compromises are open to them, none of which 
is obviously fairer than the others.  They might go to France for one week and to Italy 
for the next, or they might go to France for one year’s holiday and to Italy for the 
next, or, if they share a second preference for Spain, they might resolve to go there 
instead, or they might agree to settle on their holiday destination by tossing a coin – 
heads for Italy, tails for France.  Here there is obvious reason, whether it be respect 
for the autonomy of the parties or concern for their well-being, to allow them to 
choose their own option. 
Finally, there are cases in which the stability of an arrangement is a major 
consideration.  For example, in establishing political arrangements for a divided 
society, such as Northern Ireland, it matters very much that both sections of the 
society should regard those arrangements as legitimate.  Fair arrangements that 
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command no allegiance will be useless.  What commends a compromise solution may 
be that the two sides will recognise and adhere to a solution only if it is one that they 
themselves, or their representatives, have negotiated and agreed to.  That reasoning 
may seem merely prudential, but it need not be so entirely.  Given the link between 
the legitimacy of a compromise and the consent of the parties, it may very well be that 
the parties have a greater obligation, as well as a greater inclination, to comply with a 
compromise to which they have consented than with a fair arrangement to which they 
have not (Zartman, 2008).  
 
7. Compromise, the ideal and the non-ideal 
 
 
Nothing in our analysis of the relationship between compromise and fairness has 
suggested that compromise should be associated with the non-ideal.  On the contrary, 
we have given reasons to suppose that the practice of compromising can be part of a 
society’s arrangements ideally conceived, even though it is not a practice guaranteed 
to yield fair outcomes.  However, commentators on compromise often associate it 
with the non-ideal.  Compromise is frequently conceived as a practice made necessary 
by the imperfections of human beings and the untidy and contingent nature of the 
circumstances in which they live. 
 The distinction between ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ theory is due to Rawls (1999a: 
8, 212-217).
10
  His distinction has been differently interpreted and has received much 
critical attention.
11
  Here we use it to comment on the relationship between 
compromise and fairness, without attempting a definitive interpretation of Rawls’s 
meaning or trying to render the distinction precise for all purposes. 
 For Rawls, when we engage in ideal theory, we consider what the basic 
structure of a society would be if it were fully just.  In theorising on that question, we 
assume that all citizens of a just society would be fully compliant with its institutions 
and arrangements.  Thus, one sort of issue Rawls consigns to non-ideal theory is non-
compliance and how we should deal with it: ‘what is the just way to answer 
injustice?’ (Rawls, 1999a: 215).  In domestic political life, non-ideal theory will 
address issues such as punishment and civil disobedience, and, in international 
political life, it will include just war theory and issues raised by the existence of unjust 
regimes. 
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 If we were to apply this notion of the non-ideal to compromise, the thesis 
might be that compromise is necessary only because people fail to comply with the 
demands of fairness.  However, in the previous section, we identified a number of 
justifications of the practice of compromise, none of which depended on people’s 
non-compliance with fairness.  That is not to deny that non-compliance may generate 
a need for compromise: coping as best we can with unjust people and unjust regimes 
may often require painful compromises.  But there is no good reason to hold that the 
principal rationale for compromise lies in non-compliance. 
 Rawls also identifies a quite different sort of subject that belongs to non-ideal 
theory: ‘how best to cope with the inevitable limitations and contingencies of human 
life’ (1999a: 215).  Here his meaning is less easy to discern, especially since ideal 
theory is supposed to take account of the normal circumstances and limitations of 
political life, even though under reasonably favourable conditions.  The distinction 
between ideal and non-ideal theory is intended to mark a division of labour in our 
moral and political thinking; it is not meant to license unrealistic utopianism.   
 However, compromise is often associated with ‘the inevitable limitations and 
contingencies of human life’ and those who make most of the role of compromise in 
politics are often sceptical of the contribution general ideals and principles can, or 
should, make to political life (e.g. Bellamy, 1999).  How does this looser and less 
censorious understanding of the non-ideal bear on the relationship between fairness 
and compromise? 
 One possibility is that circumstances will arise on which principles of fairness 
are silent or indeterminate.  Indeed, it may be the very silence and indeterminacy of 
those principles that makes compromise necessary and appropriate.  Consider, for 
example, two states that are in dispute over a piece of territory, such as Britain and 
Argentina over the Falkland Islands, or India and Pakistan over Kashmir.  It may be 
that no clear principles exist for determining what would be a fair outcome of the 
dispute, or, it may be that, while states can offer relevant and plausible justifications 
for their competing claims, those justifications are incommensurable and of no help in 
determining a fair outcome.  In these circumstances, if a compromise solution is 
reached, it will be substantively neutral with respect to fairness: neither fair nor 
unfair.  It is no part of our purpose to argue that, for every compromise, there must be 
an identifiably fair outcome; our analysis entails only that some compromises can be 
tested for end-state fairness, not that all can.  However, even when end-state fairness 
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is nowhere to be found, procedural fairness may have something to contribute to the 
compromising process. 
Another possibility is that the circumstances calling for compromise arise, not 
because a relevant principle of fairness is unavailable, but because there is 
disagreement over what it is.  If we return to the case of states in dispute over 
territory, it is very likely that each state will insist that it alone has rightful jurisdiction 
over the territory, while a mediator might propose a resolution to the dispute that 
divides the territory between them.  If we are presented with those three conflicting 
views, it is tempting to suppose that fairness favours the mediator’s view, since it 
divides the spoils between the claimants.  But we cannot infer that.  It may be that one 
state really is the sole rightful claimant to the territory, while the other has no justified 
claim in spite of its protests to the contrary.  In that case, splitting the difference 
would treat the rightful claimant unfairly.  Moreover, where end-state fairness itself is 
in dispute, there may be no ‘second-order’ or ‘meta-’ principle of end-state fairness to 
which the parties can retreat to resolve their dispute, nor one that somehow supersedes 
and makes redundant the first-order fairness that is in dispute.   
 If no second-level principle of end-state fairness is available to the parties, 
perhaps they can resort instead to pure procedural fairness.  However, it is not at all 
clear that pure procedural fairness is appropriate to a dispute about end-state fairness, 
nor can we take for granted that procedural fairness will escape the dispute that 
afflicts end-state fairness.  In the territorial dispute, for example, each state may well 
hold that its rival has no rightful place at the negotiating table and also that its 
entitlement to the territory should not even be subject to negotiation and compromise.  
So dispute about what is substantively fair may translate into dispute about what is 
procedurally fair and no agreed procedure may get off the ground.  Again, it is no part 
of our purpose to deny that at various points the resources for resolving disputes 
provided by fairness may run out, so that we are reduced to pure pragmatism.  We 
deny only that compromise either can or should arise only if and because the 
resources of fairness have been exhausted. 
 The case of disagreement illustrates the potentially controversial nature of the 
‘cut’ between the ideal and the non-ideal.  If we believe that a relevant standard of 
fairness is plainly apparent to the informed and impartial, and that disagreement arises 
only because some people fail to recognise it (perhaps because their moral view is 
distorted by their self interest), it will be appropriate to assign both the disagreement 
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and the resulting compromise to the non-ideal.  If, on the other hand, the relevant 
standard of fairness is subject to ‘reasonable’ disagreement (perhaps because, like 
comprehensive doctrines and conceptions of the good, it is subject to Rawls’s 
‘burdens of judgement’), both the disagreement and its resolution through 
compromise will be proper subjects for ideal theory.
12
  
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We began by asking whether a compromise can be fair.  That may have seemed a 
strange question, since common sense would answer, ‘of course’.  We have not 
sought to depart from common sense.  Indeed, we have indicated that there is more 
than one way in which a compromise can be fair.  Rather the point of our opening 
question was to ask, if there is available an objective and discernibly fair outcome to 
competing claims, how can the actual outcome be rightfully contingent upon a 
compromise reached by the competing claimants.  How can there be moral room for 
both the fairness we use to assess compromises and the discretionary freedom that is 
essential to the practice of compromising?  
 It is tempting to deal with this conundrum by separating the ideal from the 
non-ideal: ideally a personal or social arrangement would be fair but, because human 
beings and their circumstances are non-ideal, we have to settle for something less – a 
compromise arrangement.  We have acknowledged that non-ideal circumstances can 
indeed create a need for compromise and that, either because there is no principle of 
fairness that covers those circumstances or because fairness is itself subject to dispute, 
it can be misplaced or beside the point to ask, is the compromise fair?  However, we 
have resisted the claim that that need be the answer, or even the standard answer, to 
our question.   
We have indicated that there is nothing puzzling about subjecting a 
compromise to a test of pure procedural fairness; compliance with pure procedural 
fairness, especially when it affects the authenticity of the compromisers’ consent, may 
well be a condition of a compromise’s being legitimate or valid.  The real puzzle is 
how a conception of, and a commitment to, substantive or end-state fairness can be 
consistent with allowing a conflict covered by that conception to be resolved through 
compromise, assuming that a compromise entitles the parties to agree to any of a 
range of possible outcomes rather than only to an outcome that is fair.  We have 
indicated how a compromise can be fair, and deliberately fair, and still be a 
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compromise.  We have also indicated how a compromise can be unfair and yet be a 
legitimate, as well as a de facto, compromise – a compromise with which the parties 
are obligated to comply. Finally, we have suggested reasons why, even in ideal 
theory, we should find it acceptable that people should be able to compromise rather 
than simply bend to the demands of fairness. 
 Our analysis has therefore steered a middle course between the view that treats 
compromise as either bereft of, or a pragmatic substitute for, fairness, and the view 
that insists that a compromise worthy of the name must be characterised by end-state 
fairness.  However, our analysis is not intended to be itself an exercise in 
compromise.  Rather we have aimed for an analysis that provides the most coherent 
account of our ordinary thinking on compromise and fairness. 
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We are grateful for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper to the participants 
in the Workshop on Conflict and Compromise, held at the Workshops on Political 
Theory, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2009.  We are also grateful for their 
advice and comment to Hartmut Behr, Geoffrey Cupit, John Horton, Simon May, and 
PPE’s two anonymous referees.  
 
1. For argument that fairness or justice requires compromise, see Bellamy, 1999: 93-
114; Benjamin, 1990; Dobel 1990: 79-100; Kuflik, 1979; Lister, 2007; O’Flynn, 
2006: 88-94; Resnick, 1979. 
 
2. For argument that Rawls is mistaken in taking this view and that his notion of 
public reason should be conceived as a form of moral compromise, see Lister, 2007.  
See also Kuflik, 1979: 56-62. 
 
3. For a different view, see Benjamin, 1990: 5; and Kuflik, 1979: 40. 
 
4. On exclusionary reasons, see Raz, 1975.  Raz has also described these as 
‘protected’, ‘peremptory’ and ‘pre-emptive’ reasons (1979: 118; 1986: 37, 42).  
Exclusionary reasons need not be exclusionary without limit.  For example, having 
promised to do x, I have an exclusionary reason to do x, which is qualitatively 
different from the on-balance reasons that would otherwise determine whether I 
should do x.  But there can be a limit to the reasons that the exclusionary reason 
excludes, which is why there may be circumstances in which I could justifiably break 
the promise. 
 
5. The goals sought by the parties to a compromise need not be the same.  For 
example, two warring states may compromise to secure peace; one may do so in 
pursuit of an enduring peace and the benefits that an enduring peace will bring; but 
the other may do so only as a temporary expedient that will enable it to remarshal its 
troops, build up its weaponry, and go back to war with a better chance of victory.   
 
6. See, for example, Bellamy, 1999: 112-3; Benjamin, 1990: 151-71; Gutmann and 
Thompson, 1996: 52-94; Sher, 1981.  For the opposing view, see May, 2005.  While 
May distinguishes between pragmatic and principled compromise, he repudiates the 
very idea of principled compromise and argues that moral compromise in political life 
is only ever justified for pragmatic reasons.  Cohen-Almagor (2006) makes a similar, 
though not identical, distinction between ‘principled’ and ‘tactical’ compromise and, 
unlike May, is strongly supportive of principled compromise. 
 
7. On this issue, see especially Benjamin 1990 and Margalit 2010. 
 
8. Lister (2007: 18) holds that, for a compromise to be moral, both the conflict and its 
resolution have to be moral.  But, if the point of describing a compromise as ‘moral’ 
is to say that it is morally justified or that it has been constructed on the basis of moral 
reasons, there is no reason why the conflict it addresses must be a conflict over what 
is morally right.   
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9. For a defence of the efficacy of the ‘compromising mindset’ in democratic 
government, especially as a counter to the ‘uncompromising mindset’ that tends to be 
promoted by democratic campaigning, see Gutmann and Thompson (2010). 
 
10. See also Rawls, 1999a: 308-309; 1999b: passim; 2001: 13, 55-57, 65-66.  
 
11. For critical discussions of the ideal/non-ideal distinction, see Farrelly, 2007; 
Mason, 2004; Simmons, 2010; Stemplowska, 2008; Swift, 2008; Ypi, 2010.  
 
12. Rawls himself allows that indeterminacy and its resolution can figure in ideal 
theory. In relation to the legislative stage of his theory of justice, he observes, ‘the 
question whether legislation is just or unjust, especially in connection with economic 
and social policies, is commonly subject to reasonable differences of opinion. In these 
cases judgement frequently depends upon speculative political and economic 
doctrines and upon social theory generally. Often the best that we can say of a law or 
policy is that it is at least not clearly unjust’ (1999a, p. 174).  We are grateful to one of 
PPE’s referees for drawing this passage to our attention. 
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